This factor differentiates the Spanish anti-Francoist movement from other European antifascist resistance movements, which arose during WWII in response to invasion by foreign occupying forces. This would explain how resistance movements such as those in Italy and Yugoslavia were able to mobilize so much more of the population than occurred in Spain. 2 However, the resistance in Spain was irrevocably linked to the European conflict. The evolution of the war in Europe was decisive in the development of the conflict within Spain. Furthermore, a significant number of the guerrillas fighting in Spain had previous combat experience with the French Resistance, particularly those groups sent to Spain by the Spanish Communist Party (PCE). 3 This had important consequences for the development of the anti-Francoist guerrilla forces and the violence in which they were involved. Nevertheless, the armed strategy of the PCE was different when compared with the rest of the communist parties in the 1940s.
The PCF in France and the PCI in Italy followed the instructions of Stalin to the letter, disarming the maquisards and partigiani after the end of World War II. On the contrary, the KKE in Greece and the PCY in Yugoslavia contradicted these instructions by carrying out a revolutionary war. 4 The insistence of the PCE on the armed struggle in Spain in the 1940s had nothing to do with a revolutionary commitment, but with the survival of a fascist dictatorship after the end of the Second World War. 2 The figures are always controversial. However, it is thought that, in 1945, Tito's partisans in Yugoslavia may have numbered around 800.000. In Italy, there are believed to have been more than 200.000 partigiani, while, in Spain, there were between 6.000 and 8.000. On Yugoslavia: Cohen, P. J. Europe, 1939 Europe, -1948 . London: Routledge, 1989 The aim of the present study is to analyse the violence relating to the armed antiFrancoist resistance in Spain, considering it as a continuation of the conflict which began in 1936. With this in mind, we believe that the violence experienced in the countryside, specifically that involved in the repression of the armed resistance movement and its support networks, followed the pattern of the war, especially in the facet of "intimate violence". 5 An important hypothesis of this study involves the decisive role of the "primary" groups (family members, neighbours and friends) in the development of violence linked to the resistance, both in the structure of the resistance movement and in the repressive policies of the dictatorship. However, our focus on the importance of community networks based on kinship, the neighbourhood and friendship does not imply the depoliticization of anti-Francoist resistance. On the contrary, the present study emphasizes the fact that primary groups were key vectors for politicization and that Francoism, well aware of this, violently attacked them.
Paradoxically, this policy of repression served to further politicize these groups by criminalizing entire families or groups without distinguishing individual responsibilities. Consequently, the analysis of post-war resistance and the resulting violence requires consideration of the two dimensions, political and personal, which shaped both the reasoning behind the violence and the groups against whom it was directed. While there has recently been an increase in the number of studies of political violence in post-war Spain, most either ignore the anti-Francoist guerrilla movement or pay it little attention. The violence is thus analysed exclusively on the basis of it being unidirectional Francoist repression, which tends to mask important reasons, dynamics and interactions. One of the most noteworthy is the formation of the anti-Francoist resistance movement as a result of the "brutalization" of social relationships during the war and post-war. 6 In the present study we consider that the level of "brutalization" attained by the repression in certain rural zones of Spain cannot be understood without the inclusion of the armed resistance factor in the analysis of the post-war political violence.
It must be remembered that July 1936 was not when a civil war started in Spain, but rather it was when a coup d'etat took place, with a clearly defined plan for mass violence. Once the coup had failed and the war had started, the violent Francoist coalition designed and implemented a program of political cleansing against "internal enemies", which continued during the post-war. 7 Political violence had been inherent in the construction of the Francoist state from the moment of the coup in 1936: in the words of Pablo Gil Vico, "the suppression and social control of the enemy were the essential and inescapable aims of the New State". 8 Historians specialising in this period also point to a relationship between the social conflict of the Second Republic and the violence 6 An initial analysis of guerrilla violence, in Yusta, M. Una guerra que no dice su nombre: los usos de la violencia en el contexto de la guerrilla antifranquista, [1939] [1940] [1941] [1942] [1943] [1944] [1945] [1946] [1947] [1948] [1949] [1950] [1951] [1952] [1953] which took place in the areas captured by the Francoists. 9 This relationship continued into the post-war period in some provinces of Andalusia such as Córdoba or in eastern Aragón, areas where there was later significant guerrilla activity. The class aspect of Francoist repression is also important as this was often directed at specific social sectors, such as farm labourers, who had posed a threat to the social order during the Republic.
Although the violence during and after the war was part of the same process of repression, from 1st April 1939 it was increasingly implemented through institutional channels. The imposition of new legislative and bureaucratic mechanisms tended to generalize the process of repression and social control via a structure of tribunals and police forces. Thus, the defeated were trapped in a complex network of repressive bodies responsible for a large number of accusations at a local level. 10 The Francoist dictatorship was characterized by its "structural policy of repression". 11 The aim was to first paralyze the "internal enemy" and then implement a policy of cleansing which would strip it of its identity and political intention. To achieve this, it was vital to involve a part of the population: "the terror accompanying the Francoist "new order" was not (…) an alien construct to be imposed on the population, but an instrument of domination whose efficacy was only possible with the cooperation of some of its citizens". 12 As a result of the collaboration of ordinary citizens, thousands of the defeated were sent to concentration camps, prisons or punishment battalions. Between the end of 1939 and the beginning of 1940 it is estimated that around one million of the defeated were treated in this way. 13 However, the prolonged internment of so many created enormous social unrest. Official reports show how the dictatorship began to fear a popular uprising in conjunction with the anti-Francoist guerrilla groups, particularly when the Allies began to gain the upper hand in WWII. As a result, the dictatorship substantially reduced the number of people imprisoned. From this moment on, the mechanisms of social control were largely transferred from the prisons and concentration camps to the towns and cities. 14 The local area was ideal for surveillance of the population, "especially in rural areas where people have close relationships and everyone knows one another". 15 Thus, "the atmosphere in small communities changed dramatically as they became cruel, inhospitable places where there was no place for any sign of left-wing or republican leanings". 16 In the heart of rural communities the conflict involving the guerrillas had unmistakeably local overtones. As James C. Scott noted with regard to conflict in agricultural communities: "one cannot talk about class relations and conflicts in such a community without recognizing that class relations are profoundly inflected by deep personal histories that have shaped them". 23 Javier Ugarte, in his local study on the political organization of a community in Navarra during the civil war, observed that "it was not ideas nor individual choice that gave shape to the group (…) but, rather, personal 22 Yusta Rodrigo, M. Guerrilla y resistencia campesina. La resistencia armada contra el franquismo en Aragón, 1939 Aragón, -1952 ties which implied specific interests, quarrels, sometimes within the family, friendships, patronage, etc. which initially shaped the groups". 24 In the same way, the violence connected with the guerrillas cannot always be explained by political or class affinities.
The primary groups played a vital part in the mobilization and structure of the guerrilla movement in Spain. Although their relevance can be seen throughout the latter's development, their impact was greatest in the early post-war ears. Between 1939 and 1942 dozens of armed groups organized themselves in the mountains of Spain after fleeing Francoist repression. However, these groups were enormously heterogeneous ideologically (socialists, anarchists, communists, republicans, etc.) compared to those of later years, in which ideology was crucial to their formation. In the early years, as shown by the case of José Lavín, the most important elements in the formation of the groups were kinship, neighbourhood and friendship. These first guerrillas were not united by their belonging to the same political organization but by the primary networks of socialization and their persecution by the Francoist dictatorship. Consequently, these first groups consisted of brothers, fathers and sons, cousins, neighbours from the village, companions from units of the Republican Army, etc.
These groups, which we have termed "local guerrillas" or "neighbours in arms", 25 had a special relationship with the local community. Most, or all, of their members were part of the community through birth and/or residence. More importantly, they limited their radius of action to the village or area to which their members belonged. The close links between the guerrillas and the local community were crucial for all aspects of the movement, including the dynamics of violence and counter-insurgency, as will be discussed later. However, this model came under threat from 1944 onwards when the PCE leadership decided to send political officials to Spain to attempt to form these nuclei of resistance into "a real irregular army" of national reach. 26 The intention was to combat the "localist" tendencies of the peasant guerrillas, following the classical marxist guidelines of the early 20 th century. 27 The real influence of the PCE varied from region to region but there was cohabitation in all of them, often difficult, between the communists sent from exile in France and the local guerrillas. Although both shared the idea of anti-fascism they had radically different opinions as to how to fight against Franco's dictatorship. The former believed it necessary to increase the influence of the PCE within the armed groups, to follow the instructions of their leadership to the letter and to give a clear political orientation (i.e. communist) to guerrilla activity, which, in some cases, such as the Agrupación Guerrillera de Levante y Aragón (Guerrilla Association of the Levant and Aragón) (AGLA), was conceived as the armed wing of the clandestine political organization. The latter were fighting, to a large extent, for their own survival and understood the fight in a local context. Their objectives had names and addresses and they often acted out of a desire for revenge (e.g. for the murder of family members).
The anti-Francoist guerrilla movement became inextricably embedded in rural communities through contact with the population, particularly through the "neighbours in arms" or "local guerrillas". Family groups were often the first to be recruited by the 26 The first orders appeared in 1943: SOTO, L. Los campesinos gallegos en lucha implacable contra Franco y la Falange. Nuestra Bandera, 30 April 1943. 27 Marco, Guerrilleros and Neighbours in Arms, p. 98.
guerrillas to form part of their network of contacts and collaborators. As Ana Cabana has pointed out, go-between networks were based on family, neighbourhood and friendship, plus political affinity, humanitarian feelings and economic interest. 28 Consequently, these families became involved in the resistance movement and in activities considered subversive, thus exposing themselves to the possibility of repression. On the other hand, due to their close contact with the population, the guerrillas often mediated in disputes within the community. These often had their origins in the civil war but sometimes dated from long before and were often related to typical rural issues, such as land use and ownership. 29 The studies carried out at local level in eastern Andalusia or in the provinces of Teruel, Cuenca and Castellón, on which our analysis is based, show that interpersonal relationships involving family, friendship, patronage or neighbours are equally as significant as ideological affinities when examining the meaning and aims of violence, particularly that of the guerrillas, while the violence of the Francoist State tended to be more indiscriminate.
Guerrillas and the use of violence
The use of violence by the anti-Francoist resistance was noticeably lower than in similar movements in the rest of Europe due to three main factors: 1) the strong links between the anti-Francoist guerrillas and the local community where they were active generally tended to inhibit the use of violence; 2) the development of their activities La AGLA was created by the PCE leadership in France, from where it sent armed groups to Spain at the end of 1944. They found a society which was only superficially pacified, in which a sector of the population had experienced, or were still experiencing, Francoist repression. 36 Although the vast majority of the Spanish rural population avoided any political engagement, 37 a significant number of peasants committed themselves to helping the armed movement and some, particularly those who had held positions of responsibility during the Republic and the war or had been imprisoned for their activities during the war (which were often the same) joined the guerrilla groups. 38 However, in addition to political affinities, personal ties also played an important part in the creation of these networks. Fathers and sons, brothers, neighbours and relatives became involved together in the guerrilla support networks or even joined the resistance groups. 39 Many women also participated in the networks of contacts and support in this way, although this did not mean that they had no previous ideological commitment.
This was noted by the forces of repression, who were already applying the principle of family responsibility in cases of repression connected with wartime activities.
The orders from the PCE leadership in exile in France clearly specified what should be the objectives of the guerrilla struggle, centred on the AGLA, calling for "(…) the execution of any magistrate sentencing a patriot to death (…) followed by the execution of any Falangist leaders responsible for the wave of crime and terror. This should be carried out by guerrillas but any Spaniard with a pistol or knife can and must do the same". 40 However, the reality of the territory in which the AGLA were operating was much more complicated than a simple division between Falangist executioners and antiFrancoist patriots. Furthermore, the guerrillas tended to base themselves in sparsely populated mountainous areas, far from political or industrial centres, which made the task of striking specific targets even more difficult. Nonetheless, the communist leadership saw the AGLA as an armed vanguard which could be used to attack the regime hierarchy and even Franco himself. 41 However, the arrest of the AGLA leadership in Valencia between January and March 1947 forced the guerrillas to retreat into the mountains and put paid to the idea of combining the mountain bases with urban guerrilla activity. After this point guerrilla activities would be almost entirely confined to the mountains and opportunities to damage the regime's infrastructure were limited to the sabotage of small electrical substations and to the railways. The violence of the guerrillas consequently became ever more localist and intrapersonal, tending to revolve around settling scores with the local authorities, individuals involved in repression and people who had informed on the guerrillas or their support network.
Guerrilla violence was also directed at the group itself, almost from the moment of the group's inception. The creation of the AGLA and the establishment of the leadership in Valencia was accompanied by a restructuring of the pre-existing armed groups that was probably not to the liking of all the guerrillas. Some of the tensions were swiftly dealt with by eliminating dissatisfied members accused of being "agents provocateurs".
In some cases, such as that of José Ramiá Ciprés, nicknamed "Petrol", and assassinated in December 1946 on the order of the leadership, these members were affiliated to the anarchists. 42 Other internal executions were a result of the paranoia affecting the leadership with regard to possible police infiltration, exacerbated by the fall of the communist leadership in Madrid in November 1946 and encouraged by the party leadership in France who had made "the fight against agents provocateurs" one of their priorities. Orders regarding the fight against "provocateurs", especially in the case of newly-recruited members, were a constant feature of the correspondence between Vicente Galarza "Andrés", the leader of the AGL in Valencia and the guerrilla leaders. 43 Juan Ramón Delicado, the leader of one of the guerrilla groups which had entered from
France and who had a wealth of experience as an official in the French Forces of the Interior (FFI) was a victim of these internal purges. After being arrested by the police, tortured, and then released, his guerrilla companions were suspicious of his release and eventually assassinated him in the mountains on 17th November 1946 on the orders of one of the section heads of the AGL. 44 The dual political and personal logic directing the violence carried out by the anti- without parallel in the roll of anti-Francoist guerrilla actions, was directly related not only to the desire for revenge (both Florencio Guillén, father and son, were directly involved in the action, which took place on the anniversary of Felisa's death), but also to long-running feuds within the village: Gúdar had been the scene of violent conflict during the civil war, involving the families Bayo and Guillén. Furthermore, Florencio Guillén, had led the management committee during the revolutionary period when the village's land was collectivized. For this act, he was tried and imprisoned. Later, when on parole, he fled to the mountains and joined the guerrillas. A detailled study by José Ramón Sanchís shows that behind the killings was a tangled web of quarrels and disputes which had deeply divided the community and in which family loyalties were superimposed onto political divisions. 46 The wave of violence did not stop here: the murders in Gúdar triggered indiscriminate repression, led personally by the civil governor of the province, General Manuel Pizarro. The authorities arrested 22 people, chosen at random from amongst the local left-wingers in Gúdar and a neighbouring village, who were then killed and buried in a mass grave in the mountains, which was not found and identified until 2006. In response to a brutal act, involving a mixing of political and personal feelings, in which the victims were chosen for their supposed responsibility in the death of Felisa Montolio or for being members of the same family, the regime responded with a much more generalized and indiscriminate type of violence which sought neither justice nor revenge, but to terrorize any potential supporters of the guerrillas. 
The violence of counterinsurgency
The elements of "brutalization" shown by the violence in Gúdar reflect the new parameters of modern warfare, in which the civilian population plays an important part in mobilization while also becoming a military target. At the start of the 20th century the techniques of occupation and pacification used in colonial wars were introduced to Europe. Franco and his fellow soldiers with experience in North Africa provided a good example of this during the Spanish Civil War. 47 The greater involvement of guerrilla groups in the 20 th century exacerbated this tendency. Guerrilla warfare is characterized by the ability of the guerrillas to "move like fish through the sea of the people". This, in turn, resulted in the development of new counterinsurgency techniques which converted the civil population into an important target. 48 In Spain, the rural civilian population experienced high levels of repression due to the close ties of the local community with the anti-Francoist guerrillas. According to official records, 19,444 go-betweens and collaborators of the guerrillas were arrested.
However, some researchers have suggested that the number of collaborators may have been 60,000 or even 80,000. 49 Although the state of emergency officially ended in 1948, in those areas with guerrilla activity it continued until 1951. 50 The regime's official history stated that the war had finished on 1st April 1939, but some rural areas, particularly if they were mountainous, were effectively a war zone for 16 long years. The dictatorship's violence, carried out by the Civil Guard and the military, had a huge impact which can still be observed today.
In a context which could be defined as undeclared war the show of state violence had a vital role in controlling the population and was intended to destabilize primary links and loyalties. The public exhibiting of dead guerrillas is an image often described in witnesses' oral accounts. There are also official records and the testimony of former Civil Guards detailling this practice. Manuel Prieto López, a general in the Civil Guard, admitted that he had exhibited the bodies of guerrillas "all too often" when he was a captain in a small village in Málaga. The law required the body to be put on show if unidentified, in order that a neighbour might identify the dead guerrilla. However, Manuel admits that he did the same with all dead guerrillas. 51 The aim of this practice was clearly to spread terror throughout the local community, while acting as a warning to those already collaborating with the guerrillas. However, it occasionally had the opposite effect, causing go-betweens to flee to the mountains. comrades in the mountains. 52 The Civil Guard, as the main agents of repression of the anti-Francoist guerrillas, was aware of the role of women and family in the resistance support networks and did not hesitate to target them. The actions of the two men entrusted with putting an end to the guerrilla forces in Levant and Andalusia, Manuel Pizarro Cenjor and Eulogio Limia Pérez, are worthy of note since they specifically targeted the families of guerrillas. 53 The Civil Guard and the local authorities tended to attack the economies of the families of the guerrillas. The aim was to break the spirit of resistance within the social networks of the guerrillas while emotionally blackmailing the men in the mountains.
The message was simple: the misery and suffering of the family was entirely their fault for joining the guerrilla groups and would only end when they handed themselves in.
The authorities employed a variety of tactics. In the case of a family of farm labourers, this was usually to exclude them from their normal tasks in the village. If the family owned a small amount of land or livestock, these were usually targeted by burning crops or farmsteads, cutting down trees and killing the animals. 54 Property was also confiscated. 55 At a higher level on the scale of harassment were the constant arrests, interrogations and imprisonments. The least harrowing was to be under arrest for a few hours or to have to report to the Civil Guard post every day. At first, these arrests were limited to young men (sons, brothers or cousins of the guerrillas) but were later extended to women and older men. Arrests could lead to interrogations in which the suspects were beaten or tortured. Electric shocks, having the face submerged in water, cigarette burns and beating with vergajos (leather truncheons) were normal practices for the forces of law and order of the dictatorship. 56 This type of interrogation has rarely been reported in official documents, although, exceptionally, an anti-Francoist prisoner described the torture sessions he had experienced to a judge. 57 Nonetheless, the judges never addressed these allegations and the torturers were able to continue their work with total impunity for decades.
Thousands of go-betweens spent years in prison for their collaboration with the guerrilla groups. Giuliana Di Febo reported that "the women's prisons in Madrid, Córdoba, Málaga and Segovia, especially between 1946 and 1948 (the years of maximum guerrilla activity and reach) were full of women, young and old, serving sentences of 20 or 30 years for giving food to a family member who was a guerrilla". 58 Many go-betweens spent months in prison without trial, sometimes even after the death of their guerrilla relative. This was the case of the girlfriend, parents and two aunts of Rafael López Álvarez, a member of the Agrupación Guerrillera de Granada. Rafael was caught by the Civil Guard after a tip-off when on the way to visit his girlfriend. A few minutes later, the Civil Guard killed him in front of members of his family, alleging that he was trying to escape. The five relatives were immediately sent to prison in Granada, from which, after a year without trial, they were released without charge. 59 The tactic of killing guerrillas and go-betweens and later claiming they had tried to escape was applied systematically by the Civil Guard from 1947 onwards, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of peasants. It came to the fore in the 19 th century as a method for combating banditry and is known in Spain as the Ley de Fugas. However, its use by the state peaked in the fight against the anti-Francoist guerrilla movement. In the provinces of Málaga and Granada, the principal proponent of this "dirty war" tactic was Captain Rafael Caballero Ocaña. On 9th March 1947, for example, he arrested three inhabitants of Güejar Sierra (Granada) who were go-betweens for the Clares brothers group. After being tortured in the police station they declared that they knew the whereabouts of some weapons and dynamite which had recently been stolen. The three go-betweens led the Civil Guard to the cave where the material was hidden. Rafael Caballero then ordered that they be shot in accordance with the Ley de Fugas. 60 Alongside the Ley de Fugas, the Civil Guard employed another counterinsurgency tactic which gravely affected the guerrillas and their go-betweens in the community: the contrapartidas (contraguerrillas). The contrapartidas were paramilitary groups consisting of civil guards and former guerrillas who passed themselves off as real guerrillas. The military commanders gave these groups enormous autonomy and made little effort to control them in order that they might have free rein to spread terror indiscriminately throughout the mountain villages. 61 One function of these groups was 59 The case of Rafael López Álvarez is one of two being investigated by an Argentinian court as crimes against humanity by Franco's dictatorship: Campelo, P. Dos descendientes de fusilados del franquismo en los años 40 declaran ante la justicia. Público, 27 July 2016. 60 Military Trial 496/242 (ATTMA) 61 'Orden Especial nº 3 sobre Servicio de Contrapartidas', Caja 106, Carpeta 1/1 (AHCCPCE) to carry out operations of persecution and repression of the resistance groups. A.
Hernández, a former Civil Guard, admits that they "were ordered to take no prisoners". 62 To encourage more violence in these groups, Civil Guards who did not show sufficient ferocity were punished. 63 Another function was to spread psychological warfare amongst the guerrillas' support networks. The difficulty in distinguishing between real guerrillas and contrapartidas served to spread fear amongst the peasants. 64 This tactic seriously reduced the help given to the guerrillas by those in the community as they were afraid of making a mistake and thus giving themselves away.
As we have seen, Franco's dictatorship deployed a wide range of counterinsurgency techniques against the anti-Francoist guerrillas and these were carried out by both employees of the state and by paramilitaries. The methods of this "dirty war" ranged from torture, imprisonment and extrajudicial killings to economic repression and psychological warfare. Francoist counterinsurgency, widespread and indiscriminate, honed its techniques over the years, achieving greatest success between 1947 and 1949 when the repression was at its height. It was intended not only to engage the armed groups in combat but also to destroy the extensive social support networks that the guerrilla groups had managed to set up through shared political affinities, kinship, friendship and neighbours. The violence and social control imposed by the dictatorship in the countryside throughout the 1940s brought about the demise of the anti-Francoist guerrillas in the early 1950s and initiated the rural exodus to the big cities. Here, the peasants could be anonymous while rebuilding their lives. 65 
Conclusions
In comparison with other parts of Europe the number of deaths directly caused by the violence related to the anti-Francoist resistance in post-war Spain would suggest that there was a significantly lower level of violence in Spain than elsewhere. However, to reduce the question to mere figures would not convey the real extent of the violence.
Its principal effect, both in the short term and the long term, was to disrupt the solidarity and support networks on which the post-war resistance depended and also the social structure of the rural communities themselves. It is quite possible that the massive rural exodus of the 1950s and 1960s, which depopulated large areas, such as Teruel, was related to the political violence and insecurity experienced during the post-war period.
Furthermore, it should be remembered that this violence and the brutalization of social relationships was a prolongation of the civil war of 1936; it was the repression accompanying the coup and the war that caused the chain reaction which led to the formation of armed resistance groups and it was the resolution of the conflict in favour of the authors of the coup that permitted the indiscriminate use of violence by the state against the "dissenting" civilian population.
The principal conclusions of this study relate to the clear differences in the use of violence by the guerrilla groups and the Franco's dictatorship. The actions of the former were a result of both political and anthropological reasoning: depending on local conflicts and the part played in them by the protagonists, generally guerrilla fighters, the action taken by the guerrilla groups were more or less determined by purely local reasoning, as in the case of revenge in Gúdar. On the other hand, the guerrillas closest to the communist leadership, particularly those in charge, used political and ideological reasoning to direct their actions, which, on occasions such as internal purges, were directed inwards. In contrast to the reduced and selective nature of the resistance movement's violence and its extreme reactivity to local conflicts, the state's repressive violence appears selective but massive, directed at a large section of the rural population whose members were broadly classified as 'reds' and dangerous 'enemies of the 
